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ABSTRACT
The paper seeks to improve our understanding of the concept of critical junctures. Critical junctures
have been used to provide avenues for exploring change in historical institutionalism. However, the
critical junctures concept, as it has developed, lacks rigour. We have no means of saying, with
certainty, what is a critical juncture.

If we cannot define a critical juncture the issue of path

dependency becomes nebulous, as we cannot be certain as to path origins. Over the years the critical
junctures concept has been used in conjunction with “watersheds” in politics, but without any
quantifications. This has left the approach in a quandary. Consequently, historical institutionalists
have been more inclined to look to other approach to identify change.
Improving upon the critical junctures approach involves specifying standards that enable
identification of levels of change. The remoulded approach is employed here in examining change in
the Irish Congress of Trade Unions’ (ICTU) influence over public policy in 1959. It will identify if this
change in the unions’ influence over public policy constituted a critical juncture. This example will
illustrate how the remoulded approach reduces uncertainty surrounding the issue of what level of
change is necessary to constitute a critical juncture. What is more, the remoulded framework is
applicable to any social science research concerned with change.

Introduction
For historical institutionalism the focus is choices made early in the history of a
polity. These choices will have a persistent influence (Peters, 1999, p. 210). When a
government initiative starts down a particular path there is a tendency for choices to
persist. Choices made at time T influence choices at time T+1 (Berman, 1998, p.
380). Policies are path dependent, and once initiated continue until a sufficiently
strong force deflects them (Krasner 1984, p. 240). Consequently, institutions are not
easily altered when conditions change (Schickler 2001; Stark and Bruszt 1998).
Historical institutionalism is effective at explaining what happens, and in
weaving a narrative that captures a good deal of the reality of history. However, these
characterisations of history come close to being functionalist. The problem is that
there are cases in which institutions change in unexpected ways, and the approach
appears at a loss to explain them. ‘This is the weakest and most difficult point in
institutionalist analysis,’ (Rothstein, 1996, p. 153). ‘Historical institutionalism is not
a fertile source of explanations for change in organisations and institutions’ (Peters,
1999, p. 70).
However, Pierson (2004, pp. 5-6) argues that many of the key concepts needed
to underpin analyses of temporal processes, such as path dependency and critical
junctures have received only limited discussion. This raises questions as to both the
understanding, and employment, of these concepts. Consequently, critical junctures
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have remained under examined and insufficiently specified. This paper focuses on
critical junctures, seeking to outline a framework within which to identify them, and
consequently the change points. If a critical juncture can be identified then we can
point to a period of change as significant with a greater degree of confidence than
previously.
This paper, in seeking to improve our understanding of critical junctures, is
divided into a number of sections. The first section focuses on the issue of path
dependency, and the problems within political science (historical institutionalism) in
identifying change. The next section discusses the characteristics of critical junctures,
the use of the approach, its weaknesses, and how the approach is remoulded to give it
the rigour it previously lacked. Thereafter the paper discusses the methodology
employed, and case study undertaken, to test the remoulded approach. The
conclusion will summarise the arguments and findings of the paper.

An Exploration of Institutional Change
There has been surprisingly little attentiveness in political science to the specifically
temporal dimensions of social processes. ‘In contemporary social science, the past
serves primarily as a source of empirical material, rather than as a spur to serious
investigations of how politics happens over time’ (Pierson, 2004, p. 4). An
exploration of the temporal dimensions of social processes is the weakest link in
social science’s historical turn. We lack a clear outline of why the investigation of
issues of temporality is critical to an understanding of social processes.
Exploring social mechanisms with a strong temporal dimension can address
the desire of historically orientated scholars to capture how history matters. The
identification and clarification of such mechanisms can enhance our ability to develop
arguments about temporal processes that are both convincing and have at least limited
portability. This brings us to the issue of institutional change. In historical
institutionalism there is no clear theory of how and why institutions change, with the
exception of punctuated equilibrium. However, ‘the problem with this model is that
institutions explain everything until they explain nothing’ (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992,
p. 15). In stable periods institutions are independent variables used to explain
outcomes, but during periods of breakdown, following crises, the status of institutions
is inverted. They become dependent variables, their design at the mercy of political
conflicts consequent of the break down.
In the context of temporality we turn to critical junctures. Watersheds open
and close opportunities that shape political life for years thereafter (Lipset and
Rokkan, 1967, p. 37). Periods of institutional genesis correspond to critical junctures
(Abbott, 1997). Critical junctures are characterised by the adoption of a particular
institutional arrangement from among various alternatives (Mahoney, 2000, p. 512).
Levi (1997) argues that the juncture is critical as once an option is selected it becomes
progressively more difficulty to return to the initial point when alternatives were
available.
Critical junctures establish pathways that funnel units in particular directions,
the paths spoken of in path dependency. Once units move in a particular direction
they realise increasing returns, and continue in that direction (Mahoney, 2003, p. 53).
This points to the importance of the past to explain the present, and highlights the
need for a broad historical vantage point. Moreover, this ‘suggests the importance of
focusing on the formative moments for institutions and organisations (Pierson, 1993,
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p. 602). While not maintaining that critical junctures are the only source of change or
innovation, critical junctures can discredit existing institutions and policies, triggering
change (Cortel and Peterson, 1999, p. 184).

The Use of the Critical Junctures Approach
Until now the character of critical junctures, and the perspective from which they are
analysed, has varied greatly. Some critical junctures may involve considerable
discretion, whereas others appear embedded in antecedent conditions. The duration
of a critical juncture may involve a brief period in which one direction or another is
taken, or can constitute an extended period of reorientation (Mahoney 2001).
The analysis of critical junctures has recently been finding wider employment
in comparative politics. Critical junctures have been used to understand the
trajectories of national development in Latin America (Collier and Collier, 1991).
Examining the preconditions for institutional reform in Switzerland, Armingeon and
Beyeler (2001, p. 6)1 refer to critical junctures as windows of opportunity for policy
makers. Garrett and Lange (1995, p. 628) argue that electoral landslides create
critical junctures by producing overwhelming mandates for policy and/or structural
change. Garrett (1993, p. 523) writes of this in relation to the emergence of ‘two of
the most successful instances of structural change in the twentieth century: social
democracy in Sweden after the Great Depression, and neoliberalism in Thatcher’s
Britain.’ Casper and Taylor (1996) argue that critical junctures can be used in
analysing periods when authoritarian regimes are vulnerable to liberalisation. The
approach has been utilised in examining watershed in American trade policy
(Haggard, 1988, p. 91), the political dynamic of the Chiapas conflict (Vargas, 2004),
and the emergence of occupational welfare in Israeli (Gal and Bargal, 2002). Karl
(1997) refers to critical junctures in her analysis of how “petro-states” become locked
into problematic development paths. Although the perspective’s importance is
evident in cross-national studies, it is also useful in research on long-term patterns of
change within countries (Brady, 1988).
Arguments about critical junctures have been important to research on labour
politics. Kerr (1960, p. 235) emphasises the long-term stability of the industrial
relations systems crystallised at relatively early stages. Valenzuela (1979) shows how
the filling of organisational space during crucial phases of labour movement
development freeze organisational alternatives within the labour sector. Lipset (1983,
p. 1) analyses how the historic conditions under which the proletariat entered the
political arena shaped the subsequent emergence of reformist, as opposed to
revolutionary, labour movements.
The critical juncture’s approach concentrates on historical causes
(Stinchcombe, 1968, pp. 101-29). Here a set of causal factors brings about an
outcome, or legacy, at a particular point, and the pattern that is instituted reproduces
itself without recurrence of the original cause. Central to the process of reproduction
is that institutions create vested interests, and power holders therein seek to perpetuate
their own positions (Verba, 1971, p. 308). This suggests a path dependent pattern of
change in which outcomes during a crucial transition establish distinct trajectories
within which one incident follows another (David, 1985, p. 332).
The traditional understanding of trade union politics, and state-union relations,
suggests it is an area where a given constellation of political relationships, once
institutionalised, has a tendency to persist. This suggests that a critical juncture
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framework is appropriate in the analysis of trade union politics (Collier and Collier,
1991, p. 37).

Remoulding the Approach
A significant problem is that a set of universally applicable criteria by which to assess
potential critical junctures to discover if they are critical junctures, or cases of change
that have taken place incrementally, does not exist. While acknowledging that the
development of a set of universally applicable rigorous standards for exploring critical
junctures would be near impossible, in light of the vast milieu of topics under
examination in political science, at least moving in that direction would constitute an
advance for the discipline. Thus, we are left wrestling with contradictory necessities,
the need to be more rigorous – to advance the approach, and the requirement to be
broadly applicable, if the approach is to be of use to the discipline as a whole.
Consequently, the standards developed have to be broad and encompassing.
The paper seeks to improve our understanding of the concept of critical
junctures, and political change. It seeks to ‘flesh out the often-invoked but rarely
examined declaration that history matters’ (Pierson, 2004, p. 2). The paper argues
that the critical junctures concept, as it has developed, lacks rigour. Improving upon
the approach will involve specifying clearly defined standards that enable the
identification of levels of change in order to see whether or not a specific period of
change constitutes a critical juncture. These standards will make the approach
operationalisable and falsifiable. What is more, this focus on the temporal dimension
provides possibilities for shaping some common or overlapping intellectual terrain for
scholars working in diverse research traditions (Pierson, 2004 p. 8).
The idea of critical junctures is endowed with the richness of the observation
that history matters. The analysis of what Pierson (2004, p. 77) calls ‘temporal
ordering’ is central to the claim that history matters. But, even though analysts
increasingly invoke the concept of path dependence, clear definitions are rare. This is
where clarity in regard to the progenitors of paths in path dependency, the critical
junctures, becomes important. At least if we are clear about the beginnings this
should help us in later efforts to clarify wider definitions encompassing path
dependency. In relation to the causal chain arguments, and the infinite regress
problem, a clear understanding of a critical juncture would provide us with a clear
break in the chain with which to define the starting point for our analysis. As
Mahoney (2001, p. 8) puts it, ‘critical junctures provide a basis for cutting into the
seamless flow of history.’
In 1991 Collier and Collier set out a generalised framework for analysing
change, this to determine if certain changes constituted critical junctures. In 2001
Mahoney, utilising the Collier’s framework, sought to explain why the different
experiences of the nineteenth century liberal period in five Central American
countries constituted key critical junctures in their histories. However, there was no
systematic approach, or rigorous framework, for determining when change was
sufficient to constitute a critical juncture. Consequently, a question that arises is how
to distinguish between a critical juncture, and incremental change that is relatively
swift? Thus, while answering the question may place restrictions on the liberty with
which the term is used, at least now one will be able to say with greater certainty what
is a critical juncture.
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To be able to recognise what is a critical juncture, we must be able to
recognise what is not. Not all events, even seemingly significant events, can be
critical junctures. A critical juncture must be an event that puts our chosen unit, or
units, of examination onto particular paths to development. Prior to the critical
juncture, a range of possibilities must exist for those units, afterwards these
possibilities will have mostly vanished, replaced by a particular enduring legacy. It is
here at the narrowing point, where possibilities close off, that we must seek a means
of defining critical junctures.
We argue that two separate elements are required for a critical juncture.
Firstly, it is necessary to identify the generative cleavage. This will involve an
examination of the tensions that lead to the period of change. Secondly, for the
change that takes place to constitute a critical juncture, as opposed to an incremental
change, this change must be significant, swift, and have an enduring legacy (see
Figure 1).
FIGURE 1: CRITICAL JUNCTURE
[Generative Cleavage]
+ [Change]
(Significant; Swift; Enduring)

= [Critical Juncture]

The literature on critical junctures views them from the perspective of
cleavages, placing emphasis on the tensions that lead up to the critical juncture. Since
these cleavages are seen as producing the critical juncture Valenzeula and Valenzuela
(1981, p. 15) refer to them as generative cleavages. The generative cleavage to be
examined will depend on the topic studied. ‘Traditionally, students of institutional
change focused on the importance of situations of large-scale public dissatisfaction, or
even fear, stemming from an unusual degree of social unrest and/or threats to national
security’ (Cortell and Peterson, 1999, p. 184). Wars, revolutions, economic crises,
changing balance of power, electoral landslides, and social movements may produce
an overwhelming mandate for policy and or/structural change (Cortell and Peterson,
1999, p. 184). Such events discredit existing institutions and policies, triggering
change (Tilly, 1975). As Katznelson (1997) states, the macro analysis of critical
junctures that set countries along different developmental paths has been the bread
and butter of historical institutionalism. However, critical junctures need not be
attributed only to big exogenous shocks. Many, less dramatic, events could be found
to constitute generative cleavages, contributing to change that is significant, swift and
enduring. Within the framework set out here all that is necessary to test a case is a
detailed examination of the evidence to see if it fits with the criterion for a critical
juncture.
The issue of what constitutes significant change will vary as a function of the
topic studied. But, instead of arguing, as in the past, that change must be significant,
and saying no more on this matter, here we lay down standards for identifying the
level of significance of change. These standards are to be measured qualitatively and
quantitatively. Change of below a specified point is not classified as significant,
while above a certain point the significance of the change is considered to increase
through various levels – low, medium, and high. At a high level of significance the
change would be considered noteworthy. Consequently, our search for critical
junctures is not confined to large world-shattering events, but can refer to relatively
small events, that if they occur at the right moment, can have large and enduring
consequences.
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Because we are dealing with critical junctures, periods of significant change,
we assume the change is not long and drawn out. We must reject the notion of
incremental change if dealing with radical change at a point in time. Consequently,
we add the notion of swiftness to our understanding of a critical juncture. The
significant change must be quick. In the case below a swift change is taken to be one
that occurs within twelve months. Ultimately, decisions as to swiftness will depend
on the topic, and will, in all probability, be arbitrary. Nevertheless, the chosen
standard for swiftness, having been set out, will have to be applied equally across all
cases examined in the study, adding consistency to the examination of potential
critical junctures. Then, at least, a standard will have been established to work with in
the testing of cases.
If, as is frequently claimed in social analysis, outcomes at a critical juncture
induce a path dependent process with increasing returns resulting, we shall keep the
concept of a legacy resulting from a critical juncture. Collier and Collier (1991, p. 33)
do not provide any criteria for minimum legacy duration. However, instead of just a
vague notion that a critical juncture must have enduring after-effects, we assumed that
for a change to be a critical juncture its after-effects should last for a minimum of at
least one standard government’s term of office. Although arbitrary, this is still
specific to the topic under examination, and to an extent arbitrary measures are
necessary when attempting to quantify that which has never been quantified
previously. As King et al., (1994, p. 152) state in relation to social science research,
‘a universally right answer does not exist: all measurement depends on the problem
that the investigator seeks to understand.’ While not setting a specific end point for
the duration of a critical juncture’s legacy, at least setting a minimum for its duration
makes it easier to identify a critical juncture when examining change. Should the
critical juncture have no legacy – then it was not a critical juncture. In other words, a
particular and irreversible path was not laid down at the time of interest.
It is only through the examination of its historical legacy that the importance
of a critical juncture can be established. Many social processes take a long time.
Recognition of this fact is restricted in political science, with so much research
focused on the immediate (Pierson, 2004, pp. 79-81). This is one of the benefits of
the approach set out.
This definition of a critical juncture gives rise to four possible findings, as set
out in the diagram (see Figure 2). It is only in the top left hand box that a critical
juncture can be identified. In any of the other three locations the conditions for a
critical juncture are not met. This diagram will be used here to illustrate the results of
the various findings uncovered.
FIGURE 2: THE CRITICAL JUNCTURE GRID
Generative Cleavage
Change (Significant, Swift, and Enduring)
(Crisis)
YES
NO
GC + No SSE = No CJ
YES GC + SSE = CJ
NO No GC + SSE = No CJ
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No GC + No SSE = No CJ

The remoulded critical juncture framework improves our ability to identify
change. A common framework for analysing critical junctures is vital, as without it
the validity of findings are questionable. The starting point for all path dependency
arguments is weakened without a definitive answer as to whether there is a critical
juncture at the initial branching point. The objective in setting the various criteria for
assessment is to rigorously systemise the critical junctures approach. The use of this
approach will enable the identification of what is, and what is not, a critical juncture.
This addresses the uncertainties regarding critical junctures not answered by earlier
approaches. The remoulded critical junctures approach ads an analytical tool to the
historical institutional toolkit, allowing for a more coherent researching and
understanding of past events.
To sum up, the argument in relation to critical junctures is that there must be a
generative cleavage, along with a period of change that is significant, swift, and
enduring. Should any of these conditions not be fulfilled then there was no critical
juncture. This clarity in identifying what is a critical juncture is the approach’s
strength. This provides historical institutionalists with a useful tool in exploring and
quantifying change. Ambiguity concerning the concept of critical junctures is
removed.
While not purporting to have drawn up a panacea to the problem of identifying
when a period of change is a critical juncture, this framework contributes towards
answering that question in a way that is applicable across disciplines. This is the
strength of the approach set out here. When employed in conjunction with narrative,
analytical, and counterfactual analysis, the remoulded critical junctures approach can
help the investigator identify what Aminzade (1992, p. 463) calls the “key choice
points” the forks in the road.

METHODOLOGY
The Choice of Trade Unions
Institutions range from formal government structures, through legal institutions, to
more amorphous social institutions. ‘Just where to draw the line on what counts as an
institution is a matter of controversy’ (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p. 2). Included in
their definition of institutions are such features of the institutional context as the
structure and organisation of economic actors like trade unions.
Trade union peak organisations are interest groups active within the polity.
The state actors and societal actors with whom the union peak organisations interact
all operate inside the national institutional framework. For Steinmo (1989, pp. 503504) these frameworks are the context in which groups and individuals interpret their
self-interest and thereby define their policy preferences. In this approach the trade
union centres behave like any rational political actor, defining their policy preference
and strategic objectives within the framework of the country’s decision-making
institutions.
Trade unions are usually the largest sectional interest groups in western
societies. The influence of trade union peak organisations over public policy provides
an arena in which to examine broad comparative questions. The power of trade
unions is a central tenet in the ideological debate between left and right in various
countries. The level of influence they wield within a polity can affect the formulation
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of economic and social policies, the distribution of wealth across the society,
industrial relations policy, and the use and misuse of human resources.
The case study focuses on the changing influence of the ICTU over Irish
public policy in 1959. This case study was chosen from a methodological viewpoint.
This period was identified, after a preliminary examination, as constituting a good test
case for the remoulded critical junctures approach, and its dependent variable. It
appears that the ICTU’s influence over Irish public policy increased dramatically in
that year, and that this increased influence endured thereafter. This suggests at a
critical juncture, and a consequential developmental path.
In political science, while we should not generalize from single cases, a singlecase design is appropriate when that case represents an example for testing a theory
(Eisenhardt, 1989; see also Yin, 1994). Overall, the Irish trade union movement did
well in the period 1959-1981. If this success can be called path dependent, did it stem
from an identifiable critical juncture? The remoulded approach should be able to
provide an answer.

The Choice of Generative Cleavage
Macroeconomic crises were chosen as the proxy for the generative cleavages, as they
impact significantly upon both trade unions, and their peak organisations. As Collier
and Collier (1991, p. 93) point out, labour movements and national economies are
linked to one another, their roots, and evolutions, intertwined. ‘Most scholars agree
that severe recessions make significant structural changes possible because they
render politics highly fluid’ (Garrett, 1993, p. 522). The trade unions are exposed to
the impact of economic fluctuations as their membership makes up the workforce of
an economy, and they themselves are interest groups active within that political
economy. This places an emphasis on the importance of the economic situation
leading up to a critical juncture. However, this leaves us with a degree of subjectivity
as to what constitutes a macroeconomic crisis.
However, it should be noted that there is the possibility that a generative
cleavage other than a macroeconomic crisis could coincide with significant, swift, and
enduring change in the trade unions’ influence over public policy. Although
employed here, macroeconomic crises are only one of any number of other proxies (as
discussed above) that could be utilised for generative cleavages, provided adequately
justified.

Time Frame
This paper will focus on change in trade unions’ influence over public policy in
Ireland in 1959. That year is noted by scholars as marking an important turning point
for modern Ireland. The 1940s had been a decade of economic stagnation, but the late
1950s witnessed a revival. There was a shift in economic policy from protectionism
to openness at the time when Sean Lemass became Taoiseach. If any period marked a
significant turning point in the political economic history of Ireland 1959 would be a
prime example. The change in the ICTU’s influence over public policy may have
constituted a critical juncture, as its contribution to national public policy making was
dramatically enhanced thereafter. The case study will be examined using the criteria
set out above in the remoulded critical junctures framework. The search for these
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criteria will enable us to determine whether or not we are dealing with a critical
juncture.

Hypotheses and Observable Implications
In the context a trade union peak organisation as the case study, we must determine
hypotheses that can used to test the remoulded critical junctures approach. The
assumptions that for a critical juncture there must be a generative cleavage, and a
coinciding period of change that is significant, swift and enduring, are used to derive
the hypotheses and observable implications that are testable against empirical
evidence.
The hypotheses are structured to correspond with the framework developed for
examining critical junctures. The first hypothesis examines whether there was a
generative cleavage at the time focused upon. The second hypothesis deals with the
issue of change in trade union peak organisation influence over public policy. This
encompasses the criteria of significant, swift, and enduring, change.
It must be recognised that when dealing with multivariate analyses based upon
the qualitative examination of historical events we come up against the issue of
assessing partial explanations. This realisation permits us to approach the search for,
and utilisation of, empirical data with an understanding that the empirical-theoretical
fit will vary between each observable implication, and between each hypotheses. To
identify the extent of this variation it is necessary to classify the empirical-theoretical
fit according to a scale running from none, through low and medium, to high. The
findings will be set out in a table to see if the proposed critical juncture constituted a
critical juncture.
H1. If there was a critical juncture, then there must have been a generative
cleavage (macroeconomic crisis).
Economic Data
1. If the country’s main economic indicators have reached decade-long lows, then
the economy may have been in crisis.
One indicator at a decade-long low – no empirical-theoretical fit, two indicators – low
empirical-theoretical fit, three indicators – medium empirical-theoretical fit, four
indicators – high fit.
Economic Opinions and Assessments
2. If the media regard the economy as in crisis, there may have been a crisis.
3. If economic and political commentators regard the economy as in crisis, there may
have been a crisis.
4. If the central bank regards the economy as in crisis, there may have been a crisis.
5. If the OECD regards the economy as in crisis, there may have been a crisis.
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If the above regard the economy as in crisis there is high empirical-theoretical fit,
anything less than a crisis and the fit will be lower, how much lower depending on
their assessment of the situation
Elected Representatives
6. If elected representatives regard the economy as in crisis, there may have been a
crisis.
7. If government pronouncements on the economy are consistent with a crisis
management approach, then may have been a crisis.
If the above regard economy as in crisis there is high empirical-theoretical fit,
anything less than a crisis and the fit will be lower, how much lower depends on their
assessment of the situation.
H2. If there was a critical juncture, then change in trade union peak organisation
influence over public policy must have been significant, swift, and enduring.
This analysis will search for changes in the trade union peak organisations’ policy
preferences and relative power over public policy. This approach is not measuring the
trade unions’ influence per se, but looking for indicators of change in the relationship
between the union peak organisation and government. The observable implications,
sub-divided amongst the headings of access and attitudes, structures, government
policies and trade union policies, and third party assessments of government – trade
union relations are comprehensive. The independent variables were chosen to
identify significant, swift, and enduring change in the relationship between the trade
union peak organisation and government.
In classifying the empirical-theoretical fit according to a scale running from
none, through low and medium, to high, the specific criteria shall be whether each of
the observable implications underwent significant, swift, and enduring change. As set
out above, swift refers to change taking place within months of the proposed critical
juncture, while enduring requires that the critical juncture’s after effects last for
longer than a standard administration’s term of office.
However, significance shall be the most important factor searched for, as
without significant change there is little to indicate a critical juncture. The criteria for
significance, being particular to each observable implication, will be set out
individually. Should none of these criteria (significant, swift, and enduring) be found,
then the empirical-theoretical fit for that observable will be none. Should one of these
criteria be uncovered the empirical-theoretical fit for that observable implication will
be low. If two of the criteria are found then the empirical-theoretical fit will be
medium. Should all three of the criteria be found then the empirical-theoretical fit for
that observable will be high.
Access and Attitudes
1. If the unions’ rate of meetings with the prime minister changed significantly,
swiftly, and enduringly, then the unions’ influence over public policy may have
changed.
Change of below 10 per cent - no significance, between 11 and 25 per cent - low,
between 26 and 50 per cent - medium, and above 50 per cent high significance.
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2. If ministerial attitudes towards the unions’ underwent significant, swift, and
enduring change then the unions’ influence over policy may have changed.
The identification of significance shall depend on the nature of ministerial statements.
Structures
3. If union representation on government committees underwent significant, swift,
and enduring change then the unions’ influence over public policy may have
changed.
Change below 10 per cent – no significance, between 11 and 25 per cent – low,
between 26 and 50 per cent – medium, and above 50 per cent – high.
4. If the relationship between the unions, employers’ peak organisation, and/or
government, measured by economic partnership agreements, changed
significantly, swiftly, and enduringly the trade unions’ influence over public
policy may have changed.
No change in relationship – no significance. Institution/dissolution of informal
agreement between two parties – low, institution/dissolution of informal agreement
between three parties – medium, and institution/dissolution of a formal agreement
between two/three parties – high significance.
5. If union membership underwent significant, swift, and enduring change then the
unions’ influence over public policy may have changed.
Change below 1 per cent – no significance, between 1 and 2 per cent – low, between 2
to 3 per cent – medium, and above 3 per cent – high significance.
Government Policies and Trade Union Policies
6. If government policies towards labour, measured by statements, manifestos,
coalition agreement, policy documents, and budgetary statements changed
significantly, swiftly, and enduringly then the unions’ influence on public policy
may have changed.
Identification of significance shall be subjective, focusing on the qualitative aspect of
government policies toward the unions.
7. If trade union policies incorporated into government’s policies towards organised
labour, measured by comparison of union policy documents with government
policy documents, changed significantly, swiftly, and enduringly then the unions’
influence over public policy may have changed.
Identification of significance will be subjective, depending upon the unions’
judgement.
Third Party Assessments of Government – Trade Union Relations
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8. If government’s economic policies, as identified by organisations monitoring
economic performance, underwent significant, swift, and enduring change then
the unions’ influence over public policy may have changed.
Identification of significance shall depend on the judgement of the organisations
monitoring economic performance.
9. If union involvement in public policy, identified by national economic, political,
and industrial relations commentators, changed significantly, swiftly, and
enduringly then the unions’ influence over public policy may have changed.
Identification of significance will depend upon the judgement of the commentators.
If drastic, swift, and enduring change in the unions’ influence over public policy were
recorded at the time of a macroeconomic crisis then a critical juncture has been
uncovered. However, there will be variations in the level of empirical-theoretical fit
for each of the hypotheses’ observable implications. This raises the question of how
many observables should point to an empirical-theoretical fit, and at what level they
should point to this fit, to indicate a critical juncture. This is a subjective decision.
Statisticians suggest that over 30 percent of observables at a high level of fit is a good
result. However, we prefer to set a higher standard as many of our measures are
subjective in nature. Here, a rule of 66 per cent is adopted. At least two thirds of all
observable implications, for which there are findings, should point to high empiricaltheoretical fit for there to have been a critical juncture.

Proposed Critical Juncture: Ireland 1959
H1. The State of the Economy
Economic Indicators
The 1950s were a depressed era for Ireland. The Economist points out that most
indicators of economic performance were poor (EIU, 1992, p. 5). The benefits from
protectionism had been reaped by the industrial expansion of the 1930s. By the 1950s
Irish industry was supplying as much of the domestic market as it could. The
economic indicators examined here are unemployment, inflation, debt/GNP, GDP
growth, days lost to industrial disputes, and economic openness. As Appendix A
shows, only two of these six indicators were at decade long lows in 1959, these were
Debt/GNP, and economic openness. For the other 4 indicators their low points had
passed during the 1950s. Nevertheless, none of these indicators could in anyway be
called impressive, all pointing to the dire economic situation in the country.
As can be seen, all economic indicators improved consistently after 1959.
Unemployment fell to roughly its natural level, inflation remained in single figures,
debt stabilised to a large extent, and growth increase, while the number of days lost to
industrial disputes fluctuated and economic openness increase.
Economic Opinions and Assessments
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The national and international media held negative views on the Irish economy. The
Sunday Press argued that the second coalition government was defeated in 1957 by
Fianna Fáil due to the general economic collapse, and a lack of will to tackle the
problems at its heart.2 The Irish Times observed that employment was declining,
unemployment increasing, hundreds of thousands emigrating, and the cost of living
increasing.3 From abroad, The Economist pointed out that political matters, such as
the voting system, were receiving Taoiseach de Valera’s attention at the expense of
the economy. The paper argued that ‘righting the economy would be the paramount
task facing the new Irish Taoiseach, Seán Lemass.’4 The Irish Independent had little
positive to say about the economy, alluding instead to the hope that with a new
Taoiseach things might improve.5 Time International remarked that there had been
few economic advances in Ireland during the 1950s, and that 40,000 of Ireland’s most
energetic young people were leaving annually.6
From the late 1940s onwards the Irish economy stagnated (Hillery, 1980, p.
46). ‘By the middle of the 1950s a serious crisis of confidence had developed, caused
by widespread anxiety that the performance of the economy was so poor the country
was falling behind Western European standards, not only in productivity, but in the
social benefits that productivity might be expected to confer (Lyons, 1973, p. 618).
By the time De Valera returned to office in 1957 the economy had plumbed the
depths of hopelessness (Whitaker, 1973, p. 415). ‘In the 1950s, Ireland’s relative
[economic] performance was disastrous, poorer than that of the UK as well as the
European average’ (Gráda and O’Rourke, 1995, p. 214). Between 1951 and 1958
GDP rose by less than 1 per cent per year, employment declined by 12 per cent,
unemployment rose, and half a million emigrated. The benefits from protectionism
had been reaped by the industrial expansion of the 1930s (Haughton, 1995). Stop-go
policies, in which an adverse balance of payments signalled that drastic fiscal actions
were to follow, produced severe and largely unnecessary fiscal contractions in 1952
and 1957 (Kennedy and Dowling, 1975). In the late 1950s, the outlook for the
economy was depressing, while the economies of Europe achieved strong and
sustained growth (MacSharry and White, 2001, pp. 14-19). The delay in coming to
terms with the failure of protectionism gave Ireland the status of a late starter
(O’Malley, 1989). It was this mood of despair over the economy that permitted
Lemass to subsequently slaughter a list of sacred political cows (Lee, 1989, p. 341).
By the late 1950s the Central Bank was expressing grave concerns about the
economy. It agued that there was ‘evidence of undue concentration, not only of
financial resources, but of thought, energy, and administrative ability, on projects of
questionable economic value.’7 In a damning indictment of the economic situation, it
stated that ‘a study of events during the past ten years, of the courses that have been
pursued, and of their consequences, is a necessary preliminary to the formulation of
any sound proposals for the improvement of the national economy.’8 The Central
Bank also observed that ‘the present economic and financial situation scarcely
justifies the retention of confidence in large-scale expenditure on public works and
social amenities as a means of stimulating useful economic activity and a progressive
increase in real national income.9 It also pointed to the large external trade deficit.10
There had been an excess of imports over exports during the latter years of the
decade.11 The Central Bank argued that a greater proportion of expenditure than
could be afforded had been devoted to social purposes, while too little had been setaside for the future in the shape of protective investment.12 ‘The total estimated
numbers at work declined from 1956 through 1959.13 Despite the intensive
development of sheltered industries catering for the home market, a high level of
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social investment, and large-scale external disinvestments and external borrowing, the
problems of unemployment and emigration remained.14 In 1961 the Central Bank
remarked that the 1950s had been a decade of economic stagnation.15
The OECD (1957, p. 11) observed that the condition of the Irish economy was
not satisfactory. Between 1955 and 1958 the economy was affected by the restrictive
measures adopted in 1955 to correct for a balance of payments deficit (OECD, 1964,
p. 5). Consequently, gross national product declined. The numbers employed in
manufacturing industry were no higher in 1958 than in 1951. The OECD (1961, p. 5)
argued that the 1950s had been a time of terrible economic depression. Economic
analysis of the country’s performance showed agricultural production abnormally
low, and industrial output faltering (OECD’s, 1961, p. 8). The following year the
OECD (1962, p. 5) commented that most of the post-war period was marked by slow
and unbalanced growth in Ireland. The OECD (1962, p. 6) went on to state that per
capita GNP grew at a rate of 2.4 per cent throughout the 1950s, but only because of
‘the exceptional demographic experience during this period when net migration
averaged forty-one thousand persons a year.’ This per capita growth rate was among
the lowest in the OECD (OECD, 1962, p. 6).
Elected Representatives
Government and opposition deputies recognized the economic crisis facing the
country. ‘They realised that the Irish economy could not survive in isolation’
(Murphy, 1997, p. 57). Dr Donovan, in the Senate, warned of the trade deficit,
national debt, stationary national income, and falling population. He stated that the
fascination with equilibrium economics was insufficient for progress.16 Patrick
Lindsey, in the Dail, stated it was a critical time for the economy.17 Tánaiste
MacEntee argued that Ireland would have to face up to its economic difficulties if it
was to maintain its status as a sovereign state.18 Opposition deputies accused the
government of neglecting agriculture while sponsoring an ineffective industrial
expansion.19 Daniel Desmond of Labour argued that it was time for the political
establishment to realise that solving the problems with the economy superseded their
power struggles.20 General Mulcahy, leader of Fine Gael, remarked that a tremendous
effort would be required by all sections of the community to right the economy.21
Lemass remarked that the task for the generation of the 1950s was to
consolidate the economic foundations of independence, and that 1959 was a crucial
year for economic security.22 ‘We have got to demonstrate beyond question the
capacity to develop a viable economy.’23 The problem was that economic activity
was not high enough to ensure good living standards for all.24 In late 1959 Lemass
remarked that he, and the government, were ready to support any scheme of economic
merit.25 He said the government would not minimise the magnitude of the tasks
facing the country, or the distance it was from realising it economic objectives. There
was also the need to prepare the economy for the danger of balance of payments
deficit, restrain consumer spending,26 and for measures to increase employment, and
reduce emigration, both of which were very serious. Lemass commented that in the
context of the economic problems the government was contending with the
publication of the Programme for Economic Expansion indicated its conclusion that
the measures previous undertaken were insufficient.27
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H2. Change in Union Influence over Public Policy
Access and Attitudes
When Lemass became Taoiseach he brought to government a vigorous
entrepreneurial leadership (McCarthy, 1973, p. 22). A new approach was adopted
towards both the economy and trade unions. Lemass ‘was prepared to offer the trade
union movement an integral part in the development of much of the new thinking that
lay behind the government’s economic and social programme’ (McCarthy, 1980, p.
32).
‘In February 1959 the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) was formally
inaugurated’ (Nevin, 1994, p. 96). Union unity gave the Taoiseach an opportunity to
embark on national bargaining on wages policy, as there now existed a chance that the
unions and employers could be brought together in a new framework that could
achieve industrial progress without disputes (Horgan, 1997, p. 190).
‘Shortly after Lemass became Taoiseach, he invited Congress to meet him to
discuss the question of development’ (Girvin, 1994, p. 125). Whereas the ICTU had
only one meeting with Taoiseach de Valera in 1958,28 it met with Lemass three times
in 1959, and again in 1960.29 The years thereafter saw more meetings, these focusing
on a range of issues encompassing the economy and Ireland’s policies towards the
European Economic Community (EEC). This was in line with the call for more joint
consultation between State, union, and employers in the First Programme for
Economic Expansion. Lemass’s speeches in 1959 often paralleled the positions
adopted by Congress (Girvin, 1994, p. 125). These included the need for state
involvement in development, and the expansion of the state sector.30
Structures
There was change in the unions’ representation on government committees.
Appendix B shows that ICTU representation on industrial relations committees
increased by 50 per cent, while representation on economic and social committees
rose by 160 per cent. With the move towards the liberalisation of trade, and economic
planning, Lemass was instrumental in the creation of consultative bodies involving
the unions and employers (Lee, 1989, p. 401). This provided the ICTU with more
avenues through which to influence public policy. Joint consultation was seen as
extremely important for economic development (NIEC, 1966). Some of the new
bodies the ICTU was represented upon included the Irish National Productivity
Committee (INPC), a consultative body charged with improving industrial
productivity.31 The Committee on Industrial Organisation (CIO), set up to examine
the ability of Irish industry to compete within the EEC (Murphy, 1997, p. 62). The
National Industrial and Economic Council (NIEC), established in 1963 as the main
consultative body in economic planning.32 ‘It was composed of members nominated
by the Government, the ICTU and the FUE, state boards, and the FII’ (Meenan, 1970,
p. 157). These bodies, ‘[paralleling] the state’s commitment to economic planning as
contained in the first two programmes for economic expansion’ (Girvin, 1994, p. 127)
permitted the unions to co-operate with the state on a range of problems posed by
economic expansion. ‘A new pattern of participation by Congress in government
institutions emerged between 1959 and 1965’ (Girvin, 1994, p. 127).
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Consultative bodies, and joint consultation, gave the unions a new perception
of their strength. ‘The institutional setting soon became largely tripartite, with the
representatives of business, of labour and of government discussing employment,
output, prices and trade’ (Pratschke, 1979, p. 43). ‘From the countless tripartite
meetings of these bodies, trade unionism was drawn inexorably into the framing of
social and economic policies (Lynch, 1994, p. 169). Lynch argues that this later led
to the National Pay Agreements, National Understandings, and the Programme for
National Recovery. This shows that the government’s policies towards organised
labour underwent drastic change after 1959.
The declining union membership was arrested in 1959 (Appendix C).
Between 1955 and 1958 trade union membership decreased by 9,600, falling to
306,800 in 1958. However, in 1959 membership increased by 6,900, or 2.2 per cent,
to 313,700. In 1960 trade union membership increased again, by 3.8 per cent. Within
five years of the proposed critical juncture there were upwards of 50,000 new
members in Irish trade unions, an increase of 16 per cent. After 1959 trade union
membership increased for the following 21 years.
Government Policies and Trade Union Policies
The protectionist policies that had been continued after the war were reinforced
during the 1950s (Girvin, 1994, p. 124). The late 1950s saw economic policy, as
influenced by Secretary of the Department of Finance T K Whitaker’s report
Economic Development, shift from protectionism to export led industrialisation
(Fitzpatrick and Kelly, 1985, p. xviii). ‘Sooner or later, protectionism will have to go
and the challenge of free trade accepted’ (Department of Finance, 1958, p. 2). This
constituted an admission of the failure of the economic philosophy underlying
protectionism (O’Connell and Rottman, 1994, p. 234). Whitaker advanced a threepronged strategy for recovery: more planning, fewer tariff barriers, and greater
emphasis on productive investment. ‘Thus it was in the atmosphere of a new
government and a more active and interventionist Department of Finance, that
Economic Development was born’ (Murphy, 2003, p. 61). ‘In 1958 a symbolic, but
nevertheless significant, act was the abolishing of the 1932 Control of Manufacturers
Act which, was designed to keep industry in Irish hands’ (Munck, 1993, p. 33).
Economic Development is regarded as ‘a watershed in the modern economic
history of the country’ (Lyons, 1973, p. 628). It proposed opening the economy with
the gradual transition to free trade, stimulation of private investment, the reorientation
of government investment towards more productive uses, the introduction of grants
and tax concessions to encourage export orientated manufacturing, and the
inducement of direct investment by foreign export oriented manufacturers.33 The
document advocated the abandonment of protectionism.34 These measures were
incorporated into the First Programme for Economic Expansion in November 1958.
The passing of the Industrial Development Act 1959 removed restrictions on foreign
ownership of capital in Ireland. Speaking in the Dail in June 1959 Leamss remarked,
on economic protectionism, that ‘there is need now to raise our targets and, I believe,
also change our methods.’35 He ‘had been convinced since 1958 of the inevitability
of free trade’ (Whitaker, 1973, p. 418). The Central Bank observed that ‘it is, of
course, because of the continuing need for the promotion of increased productive
activity at home that the redefinition of the objectives of economic policy represented
by the government’s statement was so necessary and is of so much importance.’36
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There was change in the government’s policies toward trade unions. Lemass’s
perspective on economic development was close to the ICTU’s. In June 1959 Lemass
remarked on the need for change in industrial development policy.37 He realised that
government policy towards labour would have to change. ‘The government began to
look hopefully to the united Congress for support in its programme of national
development’ (McCarthy, 1980, p. 32). Adjusting industries to competition led public
policy into the realms of labour practices, industrial relations, and pay bargaining.
Lemass was prepared to offer the union movement an integral part in the development
of the government’s economic and social programme (McCarthy, 1980, p. 32).
Moreover, government set out policy objectives in the area of employment similar to
those of Congress (Girvin, 1994, p. 125). This gave to unions a new perception of
their strength.
By 1960 budgets had expanded38 with increased investment in areas identified
by Congress in policy documents and its private research.39 For the OECD (1961, p.
12) the Fianna Fail government’s 1958 and 1959 budgets reflected a change in fiscal
policy. In the subsequent capital budgets, investments that made no direct
contribution to productive equipment were reduced. The OECD (1961, p. 10) found
that encouragement to industry through grants and tax exemptions attracted foreign
capital to Ireland. The government also pursued an increasingly liberal trade policy
(OECD, 1962, p. 12).
Third Party Assessments of Government – Trade Union Relations
Until the late 1950s the unions’ influence in Ireland was mainly indirect (Allen, 1997,
p. 181). However, at that time government’s policies towards organised labour began
to reflect the policies advocated by the unions. The ICTU Executive Council made
representations to the Minister for Industry and Commerce in 1959 on legislation
concerning annual leave with full pay, and minimum conditions of employment
relating to holidays, overtime, and hours of work.40 The unions’ views on company
accounts influenced the Minister for Industry and Commerce in 1959. The
recommendations of the Company Law Reform Committee, where the ICTU was
represented, resulted in amendments to company law.41 In early 1960 the ICTU
requesting an increase in pensions, and other social welfare benefit, to maintain their
relationship with workers’ wages.42 The subsequent budget increased social
assistance benefits.43 In 1961 the ICTU and the Federated Union of Employers (FUE)
reached agreement on the formation of the Employer-Labour Conference (ELC) that
the government subsequently facilitated.44 This body, established in 1962, became
central to corporate control (Lalor, 1982, p. 80). The budget of 1961 saw increases in
social welfare payments45 in line with the recommendations of the ICTU’s Social
Welfare Committee.46 The union movement played a major part in the economic and
social transformation that was coming (Nevin, 1994, p. 97). ‘From the 1960s
onwards, Congress pioneered the adoption of social policies now taken for granted’
(Lynch, 1994, p. 169)
Lemass’s realised that government policy towards organised labour would
have to change. ‘The government began to look hopefully to the united Congress for
support in its programme of national development’ (McCarthy, 1980, p. 32). The task
of adjusting Irish industries to competition led public policy into the realms of labour
practices, industrial relations, and pay bargaining. This gave to unions a new
perception of the strength they possessed. Lemass realised that the success of
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government strategy assumed a new partnership with different interest groups, which
would (in time) become players in the policy game (Murphy, 1997, p. 58).
Table 1 shows that 75 per cent of the observable implications for the first
hypothesis indicated a high fit, pointing to a macroeconomic crisis. For the second
hypothesis 70 percent of the observables pointed to high empirical-theoretical fit,
indicating significant, swift, and enduring change in the unions’ influence over public
policy. This confirmed there was a critical juncture in the ICTU’s influence over
public policy in 1959.
Table 1: The Empirical-Theoretical Fit 1959
The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 1
O1: Are the country’s main economic
indicators at decade-long lows?
O2: Do opinion polls find that the public
regards the economic state of the country as in
crisis?
O3: Do the national media regard the economic
state of the country as in crisis?
O4: Do national economic and political
commentators regard the economic state of the
country as in crisis?
O5: Does the central bank regards the
economic state of the country as in crisis?
O6: Do domestic and international organisations

High

Medium

Low
X

None

X

X
X

X
X

regard the economic state of the country as in crisis?

O7: Do elected representatives regard the
economic state of the country as in crisis?
O8: Are government pronouncements on the
state of the economy consistent with a crisismanagement approach?

X

The Observable Implications of Hypothesis 2
O1: Change in the trade unions’ access to the
prime minister
O2: Change in the trade union representation
on government committees
O3: Change in the relationship in the economy
between the trade unions, the employers’ peak
organisation, and/or the government
O4: Change in the trade unions’ relationship
with a political party
O5: Change in the level of trade union
membership in the economy
O6: Change in the government’s policies
towards organised labour
O7: Change in the level of trade union policies
that were incorporated into the government’s
policies towards organised labour

High
X
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X

Medium

Low

None

X
X

X
X
X
X

O8: Change in the government’s economic
policies
O9: Change in the trade unions’ influence over
public policy as identified by national
economic, political, and industrial relations
commentators alike
O10: Change in ministerial attitudes towards
the role of trade unions in the polity

X
X

X

Conclusion
Historical institutionalism explores the conditions under which institutions have
consequences. The most successful aspect of this literature is the understanding it has
provided of policy continuities within countries, and variations across countries.
However, this approach treats institutions as static variables. Consequently, it
provides accounts that fail to capture the essence of change.
In political science there are few tools with which to make sense of
institutional change (Thelen, 2003, p. 234). Katznelson (2003, p. 283) points to this
deficiency, arguing that scholarship has yet to move purposefully in this direction.
Consequently, any new, or revised, instruments should be welcomed. This paper
elaborated a theoretical framework to evaluate critical junctures. This will help in
assessing claims about the significance of change.
Employing the criteria set out above for specifying a critical juncture will help
researchers make more plausible claims that certain outcomes were critical junctures,
or watershed, and other were not. Along with elaborating the theoretical framework
with which one evaluates critical junctures, this could represent a big advance for
historical institutionalism and path-dependent research. An understanding of critical
junctures would provide us with a means of defining the starting point for any path
dependent analysis, solving the infinite regress problem.
The paper sought to set within its theoretical context, and test, the revised
critical junctures approach. The remoulded approach, possessing clarity, rigour, and a
focus on context previously lacking in the literature, was employed in examining
change in the ICTU’s influence over public policy in 1959 (See Figure 3). At that
time the economy was in crisis, and the unions’ influence over public policy
underwent change of a significant, swift, and enduring nature. The empiricaltheoretical fit, as set out in Table 1, was very high for both hypotheses, confirming
there had been a critical juncture in the ICTU’s influence over public policy in 1959.
With the systemisation of standards it was easier identify a critical juncture.
The remoulded approach reduces uncertainty surrounding the concept. Most
importantly, the remoulded critical junctures approach is applicable to any research
concerned with the identification of change. This raises the prospect of wide ranging
research employing the remoulded critical junctures approach in future.
FIGURE 3: THE CRITICAL JUNCTURE GRID FOR ALL FOUR COUNTRIES
Change (Significant, Swift, and Enduring)
YES
NO
Generative Cleavage
(Macroeconomic Crisis)

YES

Ireland 1959
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NO

APPENDIX A
Ireland’s Main Economic Indicators, 1949 – 1969
Year Unemployment Inflation Government
Debt to GNP
ratio
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

7.5
7.3
9.1
9.6
8.1
6.8
7.7
9.2
8.6
8.0
6.7
5.0
4.8
5.0
4.7
4.6
4.7
5.0
5.0
5.0

0.0
11.25
10.1
2.04
2.0
1.9
4.4
2.57
2.6
-0.85
0.86
2.8
4.3
2.5
6.7
5.0
3.0
4.8
5.0
7.4

49.9

52.9
53.7
54.2
55.5
57.5
57.8
58.3
58.93
55.2
58.7
59.7
58.3
59.2
55.9

Growth Rates
in Real Gross
Domestic
Product
1.9
1.9
2.26
2.5
0.9
1.9
-1.45
0.98
-2.2
4.1
5.0
3.2
3.1
4.7
3.8
1.9
0.7
4.8
8.1
4.7

Industrial
Disputes days
lost (thou)

Economic
Openness

217
545
529
82
67
236
48
92
126
124
80
377
104
234
545
556
784
183
406
936

Appendix B
ICTU Representation on Committees pre and post 1959
1957/1958
1960/1961
Employer Labour Confernece
Industrial
Factories Advisory Council
Factories Advisory Council
Relations
Safety Committees
Safety Committees
National Joint Committee on the
National Joint Committee on the
Human Sciences
Human Sciences
Human Problems in Industry
Human Problems in Industry
Hours of Work
Hours of Work
Transport Committee
Transport Committee
Apprenticeships Committee
Harbour Boards
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70.93345
82.55222
69.63176
66.85665
65.45109
67.17816
60.98576
62.7357
62.86433
62.73207
64.68637
69.80739
66.89395
69.97402
70.08703
74.32474
75.72556
74.11819
79.36693
79.29319

Economic
and Social

Price Advisory Committee
Commission on Income Tax
Company Law Reform Committee

NIEC
Price Advisory Committee
Commission on Income Tax
Company Law Reform Committee
Price Advisory Committee
Irish National Prodictivity Committee
Economic Committee
Committee on Industrial Organisation

Appendix C
Membership Changes in ITCU and CIU (pre 1959); and ICTU (post 1959)
Membership
Annual Rate of
Employment
Workforce
Change %
Density %
Density %
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

316,400
316,500
308,200
306,800
313,700
325,500
335,600
348,500
351,000
362,300
371,900
372,500
377,700
389,800
409,200

+1.7
0.0
-2.5
-0.4
+2.2
3.8
+3.1
+3.8
+0.7
+3.2
+2.6
+0.2
+1.4
+3.2
+5.0

45.6
46.2
46.5
46.9
47.9
50.2
52.4
53.5
53.0
53.8
54.4
53.7
54.2
55.1
57.0

42.7
43.1
42.3
42.4
43.7
45.8
48.2
49.4
48.9
49.9
50.7
49.9
50.2
50.8
52.9
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